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Is Youth Unemployment
Really the Major Worry?
Annama´ria Artner
Youth unemployment is seen nowadays as one of the most severe problems in
Europe. The leaders of the European Union (EU) devoted a whole summit to
the issue in July 2013. The problem seems fierce not only because jobless
youth is expensive for the society – EUR 153 billion or 1.2% of the GDP in the
EU in 2011 – but also because it affects the future of it. If an increasing part
of the new generation begins its adult life with the feeling of being unneces-
sary and having no chance to integrate into the mainstream society, the
future will be burdened with more and more inexperienced and disappointed
people with all the consequences of this. Therefore, the mitigation of youth
unemployment is of the utmost importance. To be successful, however, we
have to understand the magnitude and the roots of the situation.
Keywords: crisis; labour market; NEETs; unemployment; youth unemployment;
basic income
1. Introduction: Review of the Literature
The unemployment of young people (less than 25 years of age) is not new. It
first became a focus of labour market research and government policies in the
crisis of the 1970s (Clark and Summers 1978; OECD 1980; Lynch and Richardson
1982). The present crisis put the problem of the most vulnerable groups,
among them the youth of the labour market, in focus in Europe and globally as
well (Verick 2009, 2010; Scarpetta, Sonnet, and Manfredi 2010; Choudhry,
Marelli, and Signorelli 2011; Dietrich 2012). Looking at the present and
remembering the 1970s and 1980s when the youth joblessness crisis was simi-
lar, Bell and Blanchflower (2010) state that it feels like de´ja` vu.
Although youth unemployment has an extended literature, the problem
gains special attention in periods of recession. The first analysis during the
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crisis of the 1970s concluded that youth employment and unemployment have
a pronounced cyclical character (Clark and Summers 1978; O’Higgins 1997);
others found that the youth unemployment problem goes beyond cyclical
changes and other factors such as wages, education and experience play a role
in the longer term trends (Freeman and Wise 1980; Rice 1986; Ghellab 1998;
Korenman and Neumark 2000; Carmeci and Mauro 2003; Caroleo and Pastore
2007). This shift of attention to institutions or “labour market rigidities”
gained strength in the 1990s (Blanchard 2006). In this aspect, the inefficiency
of partial labour market reforms have been revealed as well (e.g. Blanchard
and Landier 2001)
Some papers have taken a more general view when digging down for the
reasons of youth unemployment. Decades ago, Clark and Summers stated that
“the lack of desirable employment opportunities is the crux of the problem for
those most seriously affected by youth unemployment (Clark and Summers
1978, 2).” Similarly, O’Higgins (2001) emphasised that youth unemployment is
a reflection of a country’s poor macroeconomic performance and that the
argument that the major cause of youth unemployment is the absence of the
right skills and attitudes within the young generation is only partly true, as the
real reason is that society has failed to create enough jobs for them. Still he
does not go beyond the institutional frames and suggests moving towards a
more demand-oriented strategy based on social partnership by including work-
ers’ and employers’ organisations in tackling the problem. The Manpower
Group (2012) suggests promoting economic growth, entrepreneurship develop-
ment and education among other things.
Although the results of research presented a rich palette of reasons for and
implications of youth unemployment, education and training gained
predominance as the first cause and hence the best remedy for the joblessness
of the youth. It is especially true for the policy and recommendations of the
European Commission.
The phenomenon which we call now NEETs (unemployed persons who are
not in education or training) also appeared decades ago, albeit indirectly, as a
result of the demotivation of young people with regard to doing formal wage
jobs and integrating into society (Clark and Summers 1978). O’Higgins (2001)
draws the attention to the fact that high levels of youth unemployment are
likely to lead to alienation and social unrest.
Korenman and Neumark (2000, 97) realise the strong connection between
adult and youth unemployment. They claim that “youth unemployment rates
are much more responsive to general labour market improvements than to
declines in cohort size” and that a return to low adult unemployment rates
can improve youth labour markets.
Although the predominant opinion is that youth unemployment tends to
grow faster than adult unemployment, not all researches confirm this result.
This is due to differences in methods used. Several studies build on the analy-
sis of the variations in unemployment rates measured in percentage points.
O’Higgins (2001) explains why this is not adequate to describe the relative
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importance of youth unemployment. Although the variations in youth
unemployment rates are much larger than variations in adult unemployment
rates, the two variations are proportional to one another as the youth
unemployment rate is always higher than the adult unemployment rate. He
states that the youth unemployment rate and adult unemployment rates are
proportional in the long run. In this article, we follow O’Higgins’ line and
analyse proportional changes instead of the changes measured in percentage
points.
In spite of extensive research results, youth unemployment is still seen
mostly as a particular problem. In this article, I intend to reinforce those
arguments that are seemingly ignored partly by the mainstream literature and
definitely by the European socio-economic policies concerning the character of
the youth unemployment as consequence of other things and suggest that its
mitigation is not possible without offering a solution to the general problem of
the historically increasing unemployment, the reason of which lies in the laws
of competition for profit.
2. The Framework of the Study
This study aims at contributing to the better identification of the problem of
youth unemployment through extending the scope of the analysis.
In my opinion, youth unemployment is not the most acute problem of the
European labour market. I intend to prove this step by step beginning with the
analysis of unemployment data that demonstrate that the unemployment of
older people is even more serious. I also detect that in the last decade the
relative importance of youth unemployment increased more in the developed
countries of the EU than in the CEEC or in the euro-crisis countries. We con-
tinue by broadening the scope of the investigation with NEETs. I will point out
that even this phenomenon is not the differentia specifica of the youth: it
characterises older generations too.
I use a “three dimensional” method of analysis. As a first aspect, I examine
the given problem (active youth unemployment as a take-off point) in a
moment that means here a short-term period since the crises. Then, I compare
the given problem with other aspects (the unemployment of older generations
and NEETs). As a third aspect, but simultaneously applied momentum, I study
the tendencies of examined variables by using long-term data when available.
The article builds up as follows. In Chapter 3, I identify the youth unemploy-
ment and NEETs problem. In Chapter 4, I place youth unemployment in the
context of general unemployment. First I demonstrate the inferiority of the
youth unemployment relative to the problem of unemployment in general (Sec-
tion 4.1 and 4.2). I then go on with the analysis of the young and adult NEETs
(Section 4.3 and 4.4). In Chapter 5, I present two initiatives offered by differ-
ent segments of European society, namely by the European Commission (Youth
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Guarantee Scheme [YGS]) and by civil society (Unconditional Basic Income
[UBI]).
3. Youth Unemployment in the EU at a First Glance
Youth unemployment has several direct reasons, but in contemporary Europe
the most frequently mentioned one is the unpreparedness of young people to
enter the labour market. The reason is that Europe is in a period of Schumpe-
terian “creative destruction” that leads to a new economic system with new
structures based on new technologies. However, Europe is not there yet. The
structure and level of education are lagging behind instead of leading techno-
logical change. From this point of view, the unpreparedness of youth means
insufficient knowledge of the youth. The inadequate education they receive
means there is a structural mismatch between their skills and the demand of
the market. Besides these two factors, but strongly related to them and the
NEET-phenomenon, disappointment explains the joblessness of young, even
well-educated people to a great extent. Disappointment is the by-product of
every crisis, but also the sign of fundamental problems of a given society;
what, very naturally, the young people feel at first.
In the EU27, the unemployment rate of those less than 25 years of age
increased from 15.7% in 2007 to 22.7% in 2012 and reached more than 23% in
the first half of 2013. This rate is more than twice as high as the rate of adult
unemployment which was less than 9.7% in May 2013.1
Less than 30% of those unemployed aged 15–24 found a job and 42% of
employment contracts of young people were temporary; that is four times
higher than in the case of adults. Almost every third young person is working
part time, approximately twice the rate of the adults in 2011 (EC 2012a, 4;
Eurofound 2012, 14–16). Although the rate of long-term unemployment2 – if
measured as a percentage of the total number of unemployed in the given age
cohort – is lower for those of age 15–24 than for those between 25 and 74
(31.9 and 48.5%, respectively, in 2012Q3), it is much higher if the denominator
is the number of the total population in the given age cohort: 7.3% of the
young population and 4.3% of the adults were unemployed for 12 months or
more in 2012 (EC 2012a, 4).
But it is not unemployment itself that makes the problem of youth so
severe. The term unemployment conventionally covers only people who are
not in education, want to work and actively seek a job but cannot find one.
Those are the so-called active unemployed (ILO definition). There is however a
large group within the young generation that does not belong to the active
unemployed, but is neither in employment nor in education. They, together
with the active unemployed (who are not in training), form the group of young
people who are called NEETs. The identification of this group originates from
the UK in the 1980s and the expression NEET was formally introduced first in
1999 (Eurofound 2012, 20).
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The Europe 2020 flagship initiative Youth on the Move mentioned the prob-
lem as a group of “young people at risk” beyond the active unemployed (EC
2010, 16). In 2011, in the European Union, there were around 14 million young
people of 15–29 years of age out of both education and work, 8.7 million of
whom were active unemployed.
There is a difference between the concept of the unemployment rate and
the rate of NEETs. The denominator for the unemployment rate is the active
population (those who are neither employed nor in education but look for a
job actively), while for the rate of NEETs the denominator is the population of
the age group. So, whereas the number of NEETs is higher than that of the
active unemployed, the rate of the former is lower than that of the latter.3
Youth unemployement rate ¼ Number of young unemployed
Number of young people economically active
Rate of NEETs ¼ Number of young NEET
Total young population
So whereas the youth unemployment rate was almost 23%, the rate of
NEETs stood at 13.2% for those 15–24-years old and 20.6% for those 25–29-
years old in the EU in 2012.4
4. From Youth Unemployment to the Problem of the Labour Market in
General
In order to understand the problem of youth unemployment better and to eval-
uate the youth employment policy of the EU more properly, we have to ana-
lyse the situation from several aspects. First, I investigate the youth
unemployment rate in the sense of the ILO-definition in the long run. Second, I
analyse the change of the absolute magnitude of youth and total unemploy-
ment and the relation between these two after the outbreak of the crisis
(share of young unemployed – SYU). I compare the SYU to the changes of the
relative size of the youth cohort in the total (15–74-years old) population.
After analysing these data (Section 4.1 and 4.2), I will dig into the problem
of the NEETs (4.3). In Section 4.4, I flesh out the fundamental roots of youth
unemployment and NEETs, which go far beyond the age-cohort differences of
the labour market.
4.1. The Youth Unemployment Rate
In Section 3, I present data for the sharp increase of youth and general unem-
ployment after 2007. But if we look back in time we find a different trend. In
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the middle of the 1990s, the youth unemployment rate in the EU15 and the
Euro175 was not much lower than today: 20–21% in 1995–1996 against 22–23%
in 2012. Between 1996 and 2001, the rate fell to 14–15%. For the EU27, data
are available only from 2000 on. Since 2000, the trends are similar in these
three country groups: between 2001 and 2004–2005, the youth unemployment
rate increased by 2–3 percentage points then fell again until 2007. After that
it skyrocketed, and in 2009 reached the trend line that began in 2000 and the
rates of the three country groups became similar, moving around the 22–23%
level (Figure 1).
The averages of these groups, however, hide important inner differences.
For example, in Spain, youth employment has always been the most fragile
segment of the labour market. The rate of unemployment for people less than
25 years of age was above 40% at the time of the Spanish accession to the EU
(in 1986) and after a period of decrease this rate jumped to over 40% again in
1993–1994. The youth unemployment rate in Spain was the highest in the
EU15 until 1998. Since then, for a decade until the explosion of the crisis,
Greece and Italy, then also some Eastern European new member states have
taken over the lead from Spain.
In the CEECs, trends are partly similar. Today the Baltic States, Hungary,
Slovenia and Croatia have higher rates of youth unemployment than at any
point in the past one-and-a-half decades. But Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and
Slovakia have already produced rates in the first years of the 2000s that were
Figure 1. Youth unemployment rates in the EU15, Euro17* and EU27 1993–2012,
percent. *17 members of Eurozone
Source: Eurostat.
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close to or even higher than those in any quarters since the beginning of the
present crisis.
To sum it up, today youth unemployment rates in most of the EU27
increased after 2008, but the phenomenon and even the level of youth unem-
ployment rates are not new at all.
4.2. The Share of Youth Unemployment in Total and Comparatively to
the Youth Population Share
In the first quarter of 2008 in the EU27, youth (less than 25-years old) unem-
ployment hit its lowest point in the preceding 10 years by slightly over 4 mil-
lion persons. Since then it has increased by 39.6% or by more than 1.6 million
until the first quarter of 2013. However, the present level (5.6 million in
2013Q1) is higher only by 5–800,000 or approximately 12% than it was in the
first half of the 2000s.
On the other hand, the number of unemployed aged more than 25 years has
increased much more dynamically than that of the young unemployed and far
outstripped not only the best years before the crisis, but also the worst quar-
ter of the 2000s (16.1 million in 2004Q4). Between 2008Q1 and 2013Q1, as a
result of the crisis, the number of those aged 25–74-years old who were unem-
ployed swelled by 72% or by 8.7 million.
These data hide differences between the countries. In 2012 in Spain, where
youth unemployment rates are among the highest in the EU, there were half a
million more young unemployed than before the crisis, but the number for
2012 (945,000) is lower than in 1996 (973,000) or in 1983–1988 and 1993–1995
when there were more than 1 million young unemployed in the country. As a
result of the crisis, the number of unemployed who were aged 25–74 years
grew much faster (223% between 2008Q1 and 2013Q1) than that of those aged
less than 25 years (93% in the same period).
This is true also for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, where youth unem-
ployment was not higher at the end of 2012 than it was at the end of the
1990s or in some years of the 1980s. After 2007, in all of the above-mentioned
five countries the level of unemployment in general and in the 25–74 age
cohort increased faster than the number of young (less than 25) unemployed.
Similarly, after 2007, in the CEECs the total number of young unemployed has
grown more slowly or at about the same pace as the total number of unem-
ployed. On the other hand, the number of young unemployed increased faster
than that of the adult unemployed in the majority of the most developed
countries of the EU.
In spite of these, the prevalent opinion is that youth unemployment is more
sensitive to crisis than total unemployment or – what is only another relation –
adult unemployment. (OECD 2008; ILO 2010; Choudhry, Marelli, and Signorelli
2011; Bell and Blanchflower 2011). This result stems from the regression
analysis of the unemployment rates of different age cohorts on the basis of
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percentage point changes. This method is, however, problematic. On the one
hand, the denominator of the unemployment rate tends to be much less rela-
tive to the size of the population of the age cohort in the case of youth than in
the case of adults because there are proportionally more young people in edu-
cation than adults.6 On the other hand, the use of percentage point changes in
unemployment rates in analysis, and as O’Higgins also (2001, 2010) remarks,
paints a more dramatic albeit less accurate picture of the relative change in
youth unemployment, since the youth unemployment rate is always higher than
the adult rate.
For this reason, I think the share of young people in total unemploy-
ment is a useful additional indicator for understanding the relative impor-
tance of youth unemployment in the crises and in the long run. First of
all we have to emphasise that the rate of youth unemployment and the
share of young people within total unemployment are two different ratios.
The former is equal to the number of unemployed per active population
(employed plus active unemployed) in the given age cohort, whereas the
latter is:
Share of young unemployed (SYU) ¼ Number of young unemployed
Number of all unemployed
Looking at the change in the SYU in Europe, the first result that has to
be mentioned is that the SYU has decreased in almost all member states of
the EU in the present crisis, i.e. between 2008 and 2012. That means that
the relative importance of youth unemployment has lessened. The longer
term tendencies are also important and paint different pictures of the coun-
try groups.
The SYU was 24.3–25.2% in the EU27 between 2000 and 2008. Since 2008
SYU has been continuously decreasing and stood at 21.2% in April 2013, the
Table 1. Rate of NEETs by age groups, percent
2007 2011
Eurostat data
From 15 to 19 years 6.1 6.6
From 15 to 24 years 10.7 12.5
From 20 to 24 years 15.0 17.8
From 20 to 34 years 16.6 19.0
From 25 to 29 years 17.2 19.6
From 30 to 34 years 17.6 19.6
Own estimation
From 35 to 64 years 18.1 17.6
From 35 to 54 years 16.3 15.8
From 55 to 64 years 22.6 21.9
Source: For age cohorts between 15 and 34 years: Eurostat; for age cohorts between 35 and
64 years: own calculations using Eurostat data.
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lowest level ever since 2000 (the first year when data are available). This is
especially true for the EU15, where the SYU was 28.8% in 1993, a record that
was not even beaten in 2008 – the worst year since 1997. Since 2010, young
people have represented a smaller part in total unemployment than one and a
half decades before. The decreasing trend of the SYU in total is even more
pronounced in the case of Greece and Spain – these countries are well known
for their high rate of total and youth unemployment and hence are frequently
used to illustrate the severity of youth unemployment (Figure 2).
Besides, in 2012 almost all CEECs had a smaller share of youth unemploy-
ment in total than in 2008, and no CEEC had a higher rate than it had already
experienced some time in the last 10–15 years (Figure 3).
Figure 4 shows the percentage point change of the SYU for the 27 members
of the EU between the first years of the 2000s and 2012 by country groups
(Figure 4). The SYU decreased first of all in the less developed member states.
On the other hand, in eight out of 10 of the most developed member states
the youngsters took a higher share in total unemployment in 2012 than
10–12 years ago, in spite of the fact that their share in 2012 was usually lower
than in 2008. This follows from the fact that in these countries the
unemployment of those aged 25 and over increased more than those of less
than 25 years of age. Consequently, in this relative sense, the problem of
youth unemployment deteriorated first of all in the more developed member
states in the past decade.
Figure 2. SYU aged less than 25 years in total unemployment (SYU) 1996–2012 in the
EU15, EU27, Greece and Spain, percent
Source: Eurostat.
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From the above we can conclude the following.
(1) In the past long decade in the EU27, on average, the elasticity of the
youth unemployment rate to the adult unemployment rate was less than
one. This coincides with Higgins’ (2010) results for the EU in the period
from 2005 to 2009 (“the elasticity of the youth unemployment rate to the
adult unemployment rate has tended to be less than one”, 8) My analysis
produced the same result for the OECD average in 1970–2011: in the
overwhelming majority of these 32 years the youth unemployment rate
increased less (in absolute percentages not in percentage points!) than
the general unemployment rate.
(2) The SYU shows different pictures in the country groups of the EU27. The
SYU has a tendency been declining in the “inner periphery” (in the less
developed members) of the Union. The trend is, however, just the oppo-
site in the developed or “core” countries.
The shrinking of young people’s share in total unemployment (SYU, 15–
24 years of age) may be a result of the decrease of share of youngsters (aged
15–24 years) within the population aged 15–74 years (labour force). For this
reason, I examined the relation of these two shares by computing a ratio that I
call relative youth unemployment (RYU):
Figure 3. Share of young people aged less than 25 years in total unemployment (SYU)
in 11 new member states of the EU, percent
Source: Eurostat.
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Relative youth unemployment (RYU) ¼ SYU
Proportion of the youth in population
On the aggregate level the relative size of the 15–24 age cohort in popula-
tion force has been continuously decreasing since 2000 in the EU27. On the
other hand, the SYU changed cyclically: increased during years of recovery
built on the credit boom before the crisis and fell after 2008. The RYU has
changed accordingly: increased before the crisis and then declined. In 2012
the RYU of the EU27 was lower than in any other years looking back over more
than a decade (Figure 5).
This relative irrelevance of the cohort sizes coincides with the results of
Korenman and Neumark (2000) who examined data for 15 OECD countries in
the period 1970–1994 and found that relative youth cohort sizes cannot
explain changes in youth unemployment sufficiently: “Youth unemployment
rates are much more responsive to general labour market improvements than
to declines in cohort size” (97).
Figure 4. Change in SYU between the average of 2000–2002 and 2012 (percentage
point) (For the colour version): Blue: developed members; green: less developed mem-
bers of EU15 i.e. euro-crisis countries (PIIGS); yellow: least developed members (acces-
sion in or after 2004) (For the black version): Black: developed members; transparent:
less developed members of EU15 i.e. euro-crisis countries (PIIGS); grey: least developed
members (accession in or after 2004)
Source: Own calculations on the basis of Eurostat online database, Statistics by theme,
various data for unemployment.
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The EU-average of the RYU hides differences. In 2012 the RYU was lower or
the same in the majority of the 18 less developed countries of the EU28 (five
euro-crisis countries, 11 CEECs, Malta and Cyprus) than in the last years of the
1990s and/or in the first years of the 2000s.7 This is true only for two to three
countries8 out of the 10 more developed member states. In other words, in
spite of the decrease after 2008, in 2012 the RYU was higher in the majority of
the developed member states than at the end of the 1990s and/or the begin-
ning of the 2000s. This result reinforces my earlier conclusion, namely, that
the relative importance of youth unemployment increased first of all in the
developed EU-members after the end of the 1990s.
Youth migration from the lower to the higher income countries may be a
possible explanation for this phenomenon. The Spanish case, however, contra-
dicts this hypothesis. Although immigration has been characteristic to Spain in
the 2000s, the Spanish RYU has decreased between 1998 and 2012 almost con-
tinuously from 2.3 to 1.4. A more possible explanation is the growing participa-
tion of youth in third-level education in the “inner periphery” of the Union. All
in all a farther investigation is needed to explain the different paths of the
RYU in different country groups of the EU.
The special attention that youth unemployment has gained in the past
few years is not satisfactorily justified on the ground of the above data,
since the unemployment of adults is a more serious issue than that of the
youth. But, this is not the end of the investigation of the problem of youth
joblessness.
Figure 5. RYU in the EU27
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
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Up until now I have examined “active” unemployment (ILO definition). Job-
lessness, however, is not the same. The number of “discouraged” or “disen-
gaged” people who are not on the labour market is on the rise and among
them youngsters seem to be overrepresented. In the next section I will detail
this problem.
4.3. The Genesis and Challenge of NEETs
The crisis put unemployment into the limelight. However, as we see from
the above, the crisis aggravated and rendered acute the already existing
problems of the European labour market, but did not generate them. This is
true for unemployment in general and for its special characteristics too. For
example, the problem of NEETs has already appeared long before the crisis,
although not in continental Europe. As we mentioned earlier, the phenome-
non was already discovered in the UK in the 1980s, but as a crucial prob-
lem, affecting several countries, was identified in Latin America as the “ni-
ni” (“ni estudia ni trabaja”– neither studying nor working) generation in the
1990s. At the end of that decade, in Latin-America more than 20% of young
people were outside school and without a job according to the ILO (Diez de
Medina 2001, 48). Almost half of them did not even seek a job, i.e.
belonged to the “ni estudian, ni trabajan, ni buscan trabajo” (“neither
studying, nor working, nor wanting to work”) group, or to the NEET (Filgue-
ira and Fuentes 2001, 19).
In the crisis hit-Europe, the phenomenon first became apparent as a Span-
ish, then as a Greek “peculiarity”, but as unemployment in the EU was on the
rise and proved to be persistent, the attention turned to the issue of youth
unemployment in general; especially because the first fire-fighting measures of
the governments aimed to maintain employment. Less attention was devoted
to job creation which is of the utmost importance for the new entrants to the
labour market, among them first of all youngsters. Thus, the youth employ-
ment rate decreased much faster than that of the other age groups. Between
2008 and 2012, the youth employment rate dropped from 37.3 to 32.9%. In the
same period, the employment of those between 25 and 54 years of age
decreased only from 79.5 to 77.2%, while the employment rate of the 55–
64 years age group increased.
An additional problem that – similarly to all the other problems of the
labour market – is not new but made the situation even worse is the insuffi-
cient rate of participation in education of those in the 15–24 years of age
group. This rate grew fast between 1998 and 2005. In 2006 it fell and in 2007
began to increase again but at a much slower space than before. The rate of
participation in education reached the level of 2005 (60.2%) only in 2009.9
But, probably, all these numbers would not be sufficient to get the atten-
tion of politicians in the absence of mass youth protests against the austerity
measures (among them the increase of tuition fees).
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Unlike (active) youth unemployment, in the less developed member states,
the NEETs problem is more severe than in the more developed member states.
The 10 most developed member states10 have a diminishing share in the total
number of NEETs in the Union with 35.3% in 2011.11
As far as the longer term trends of NEETs are concerned, Eurostat provides
data back to 2000. Figure 6 shows that in 2012 the rate of NEETs was about
the same in the 20–34 age cohort and smaller in the 15–19 age cohort as at
the beginning of the 2000s. The boom in the middle of the 2000s fed by the
financial bubble decreased the rate – as it decreased the rate of unemploy-
ment in general – but the crisis re-established the previous conditions.
All this leads to the conclusion that it is the NEET-phenomenon instead of
conventional youth (active) unemployment that poses a threat to the European
labour market and to the European society in general. The threat to the soci-
ety stems from the following.
First, it is well known that young people are easier to dismiss because of
the temporary and other less safe or “precarious” forms of their employment
and they, as new entrants, find jobs in a shrinking labour market with more
difficulty. This makes them feel they have no perspectives and have nothing to
lose. Second, due to decreasing jobs and changing technologies, employment
increasingly depends upon skills and knowledge that correspond to the specific
and immediate needs of companies. This means that new entrants have to sur-
render their life – their personal wishes, dreams, talent etc. – increasingly to
the needs of the “labour market”, or, more directly speaking, to the “profit-
Figure 6. Rate of NEETs 2000–2012, percent
Source: Eurostat.
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ability” of firms. If they want to subsist, they have to earn money in deterio-
rating social circumstances as the welfare state has gradually been dismantled
since the 1980s. The price of their subsistence is giving up their ideals in a
wider sense. They have to be wage earners as the “market” i.e. profitability
requires, instead of having the possibility to live and work as they would like
to. What is more, depressed wages allow them little room to manoeuvre
between wage-work and self-realisation. This makes youth disappointed and
angry and inspires them to turn away from or even against the society. Third,
youngsters have fewer social responsibilities as they have usually no children,
property or social position to fear for. As a consequence, they give way to
their dissatisfaction and anger more easily. They are among the first who are
ready to protest, fight, occupy, insist upon their demands or pursue a more
“dangerous” life.
Disappointed youngsters are jeopardising the status quo. This is obvious if
we think of movements that arose in the last 5 years of the crisis in Europe
and also in America (see e.g. Afatsawo 2011; Huffington 2011; Karimi and Ster-
ling 2011; Sassen 2011). Young people are not identical with the unsatisfied
protesting mass at all, but they are the engine of the protests, as they were in
1968. They are going to play a more significant role in articulating the indigna-
tion of the unemployed and underpaid or indebted population, especially in
countries where austerity measures seem to be never ending and/or the insti-
tutions and culture of democratic interest representation are not developed
enough. This is the case not only in countries like Greece or Spain but also in
the CEECs where the mobilisation ability of traditional trade unions and grass-
roots civil organisations is rather weak.
For 2011, Eurofound presented maps that show the density and activity of
NEETs by countries (Mascherini 2012). The proportion of NEETs is very high in
Spain, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Ireland and high in UK and Latvia. The
political and social engagement of the NEETs is highest in the most crisis-hit
Eurozone members, namely Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.
4.4. The Labour Market in General – NEETs are all Around
It has to be stressed that the underlying reason behind the disengagement and
exclusion from the society of an increasing part of young people is the gener-
ally high unemployment. There have never been so many people without a job
in Europe as there are today. Since 2009, in the EU15 the level of unemploy-
ment has been higher than it was at its peak after the WWII. Then, in 1994, it
was 17.7 million or 10.5%. In the EU15 unemployment reached 20.6 million
(10.6%) in 2012 and 22.3 million (11.5%) in March 2013.12
As for the EU27, the figures far outstrip the worst year (2004) since 2000 for
which data are available. In 2012, there were 25.3 million unemployed, 4.1
million more than in 2004. In 2012, the rate of unemployment in the EU27
reached 10.5%, whereas it stood at 9.3% in 2004.13
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And here we can deepen the analysis of the problem by investigating the
rate of NEETs in the older generation. Eurostat does not give data for that, so
I made calculations on the basis of other Eurostat data to estimate the NEET-
rate of the adult population.14 The results are summarised in Table 1.
From the data we can conclude the following:
 Between 2007 and 2011 the rate of NEETs increased among young people
and decreased in the adult population.
 Apart from the 15–19-year-age group, the majority of whom are in compul-
sory education, the rate of NEETs is lowest in the 35–54-year-old age
cohort and the highest in the 55–64-year-age group.
 Among the younger cohorts those aged from 25 to 34 years have the highest
NEETs rate. This is the life period when youngsters should start a family.
The YGS of the European Commission aims at the 15–24-year age cohort
only.
 The most important conclusion is, however, that there are numerous NEETs
in the adult population too and there is not such a big difference among
age groups regarding NEETs rates as regarding unemployment rates.
Whereas the youth unemployment rate is more than twice as high as the
adult unemployment rate, there is only a few percentage points difference
in the NEETs rates (except for the 15–19-year-age cohort again, where the
rate of NEETs is the lowest because of education). On the ground of the
above data, there were 37 to 39 million NEETs in the 35–64 years of age
cohort and their number was approximately 23 million in the most active
cohort aged 35–54. This means 57–59 million NEETs between 15 and
64 years of age. Taking the above into consideration, the problem of young
NEETs seems to be exaggerated and/or the problem of adult NEETs seems
to be neglected. Concentrating on the problem of young NEETs reflects a
particular view.
Further calculations are needed to detect the long-run tendencies of adult
NEET rates on the one hand and the differences between youth and adult NEET
rates in member states on the other. Adult NEET rates in less developed
countries are likely to be higher than those of more developed countries. The
primary reason for this can be the more extended informal economy in less
developed countries, but this fact is to be taken into account also in
connection with the rate of young NEETs. Still, we have to underline that on
an aggregate level in the EU the “disengagement” of the adult population is
not meaningfully less than that of the young population.
Taking into consideration the generally high level of NEETs and unemploy-
ment, we think that in spite of the higher vulnerability of young generations,
which justifies to a certain extent the special attention what they gained, the
core problem is neither youth unemployment nor the young NEETs in
themselves. It is total joblessness that makes increasing youth disengagement
basically unsustainable. Thus, the problem of youth unemployment and young
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NEETs is only the tip of the iceberg and cannot be solved without curing the
general problem of unemployment and adult NEETs.
5. Seeking a Policy Solution and Cooperation with Civil Society: The
YGS and the UBI
The YGS of the EU aims at ensuring that young people under the age of 25 are
either in job or in education within four months after having left school or
their last job. To this purpose, the Commission devotes EUR 8 billion in addi-
tion to the already existing EU funds between 2014 and 2020. The scheme is to
be introduced by each member state in 2014.
The idea is not new in Europe as there have been similar systems for exam-
ple in Finland (which was a kind of “pattern” for the initiative of the Commis-
sion) and also Austria, France, the Czech Republic, Denmark. Hungary
launched its “First Job Guarantee” programme in August 2012. In Austria, the
“Training Guarantee” programme was introduced in 2008 (EC 2012a, 14–15).
There are at least three basic problems with the YGS.
First, the YGS does not help NEETs between 25 and 34 years of age, the rate
of whom is the highest among the younger population. Besides, neither the
YGS nor other initiatives of the European Commission or the national govern-
ments are suitable for solving the long-term problem of increasing joblessness
in general.
Second, the question is, what kind of education, training, job and, first of
all, what perspective young people will get from the YGS or similar pro-
grammes. For example, the present Hungarian legislation concerning voca-
tional training is in line with the YGS inasmuch as it supports vocational
education in secondary schools. The crux is, however, that at the same time
the government lowered compulsory school attendance age from 18 to
16 years. This measure testifies to the view nowadays prevailing that the goal
of the education system is or should have to be to create a new labour force
as quickly as possible for “business” i.e. to earn profit. In vocational education
little or no general knowledge is taught, as there is obviously no need for that
in most segments of production where “skilled” young people are to be
employed. The obvious priority is the employability of the youth. Furthermore,
the well-known demand of “industry” for quick and “practice oriented” educa-
tion contradicts the other slogan that is frequently voiced by political and sci-
entific circles, namely that Europe has to become a “knowledge-based
society”. To sum it up, a “whatsoever” type of education and training cannot
satisfactorily decrease the number of NEETs in the long run.
The third problem is financing. The YGS offers 8 billion Euros for 7 years,
which means 1.14 billion Euros per year for regions with levels of youth (less
than 25 years of age) unemployment higher than 25%. If we presume that only
half of the 7.5 million NEETs under 25 years live in such regions, we conclude
that YGS offers around 2100 Euros per head of NEETs.
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According to the evaluation of 28 Swedish projects implemented between
2007 and 2012, the potential gains from measures helping young people
(between 18 and 30) to reintegrate into the labour market reach 4200 Euros in
the first year and 51,870 Euros per participant over five years. For this, how-
ever, Swedish authorities together with the European Social Fund have spent
7810 Euros per participant of the projects on average (EC 2012b, 13). Accord-
ing to the ILO, the full integration of the younger NEETs is even more expen-
sive. In 2010, the cost of the Swedish job guarantee programme for those
between 18 and 24 years of age was close to 6000 Euros per participant. As a
result, 46% of the participants had “successful outcomes”. (ILO 2012, 46) This
means that around 12,000 Euros were needed to help one NEET back to the
labour market or education.
So, even if we take into consideration the differences between price levels
in the member states and count with half of the Swedish costs only, the mem-
ber states have to double the YGS from the national budgets in order to give
effective help for only half of the 7.5 million 15–24-year-old European NEETs.
According to the ILO (2012, 48), implementing a young guarantee programme
would cost about 21 billion Euros in the Euro zone only. There are however no
additional resources, particularly in those countries where the problem is the
most severe and tackling the high level of general unemployment demands also
extra efforts from them.
There is another initiative that reflects a more complex approach. It
stems from European civil society and aims at changing the position of
wage labour in Europe, solving the problem of unemployment for good and
all while liberating the proactive spirits of the society. The idea is the UBI
that is neither new nor unknown in the world, but is currently applied by
some rich oil countries only. The concept originated from Thomas Paine in
the eighteenth century, fed the development of the welfare state until the
1980s and has been updated to the present European circumstances in the
last decade (Van Parijs 2004). The concept has been debated for a long
time (see e.g. White 1997; Van Parijs 1997;Van Der Veen 1998; Tod 2008;
Goedeme´ and Van Lancker 2009). The essence of the idea is that every
person, irrespective of age, position, profession etc, would be entitled to
receive an amount that provides for a decent standard of living. (ECI
2013a, 2013b; Ha¨ni and Schmidt 2013; Wortstall 2013). The protagonists
argue that in such circumstances where people are liberated from the
pressure of wage labour the productivity of the society would enhance.
The initiative contains a tax-reform element too. The UBI was registered
as a European Citizens’ Initiative in January 2013 (EC 2013). The remit of
the UBI is that, unlike the YGS, it treats the problem of the European
society in its complexity, tackles the root of the problem and offers a
similarly complex solution.
The UBI seems to be even more problematic than the YGS from the view-
point of financing, elaborating the institutions and changing the society’s gen-
eral way of thinking. But Europe’s problems, namely the growing joblessness,
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poverty, income differences, dissatisfaction with the European Union and the
welfare state in general, are complex issues themselves. So, the possible solu-
tion will not be simple, low cost and rapid either.
6. Conclusion
The problem of youth unemployment has been present in Europe for dec-
ades. Although the crisis hit youngsters badly, the unemployment of older
people grew more. The share of youngsters within total unemployment is
smaller now than it was 10 years ago in the majority of the less developed
countries of the EU. This cannot be explained by the decreasing trend of
the proportion of the youth in the total population, as the trend of RYU
testifies. On the other hand, in the majority of the most developed member
states the weight of youth unemployment in total tends to be higher and
has increased more than in the less developed members since the beginning
of the 2000s.
It is the NEET-phenomenon instead of conventional youth (active) unem-
ployment that poses a great threat to the European labour market and to
the European society in general. But what is more important: the long-term
problem of youth employment and the increasing rate and number of young
NEETs are only the consequences of tendentially increasing total unemploy-
ment, the high rate of NEETs among adults and the increasing polarisation
of society. For these problems the EU and its YGS does not offer an ade-
quate solution.
The engine of our market economy nowadays is the imperative to be
competitive and sufficiently profitable on the market. The profit motive
looks for cheaper unit labour costs, and thus causes historically and tenden-
tially increasing unemployment that inevitably leads to the rise of workless
and disappointed generations. This tendency can be broken by ensuring a
safe existence and participation in the society for all its members. Instead
of or at least alongside the particular and old methods of curing the imme-
diate problems only a fundamentally changed and complex view of the
labour market can help. The UBI initiative of European civil society is exem-
plary. In the absence of such an approach, particular policies, programmes
and schemes, be these ever well elaborated and financed, can only offer
temporary success at best.
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Notes
1. Eurostat statistics by theme, unemployment rate by sex and age groups – annual average.
2. Unemployed for 12 months or more.
3. For further explanation of the NEET concept and indicator see Eurofound (2012, 20–24).
4. Eurostat statistics by theme, participation of young people in education and training by
employment status, age and sex (incl. NEET rates).
5. 17 members of the Eurozone.
6. For this reason Choudhry, Marelli, and Signorelli (2011) changed the denominator of youth
unemployment to the population (unemployment ratio). This, however, changes the problem
without solving it because by doing this, the denominator of youth unemployment rate
becomes proportionally larger than the denominator of the total or adult unemployment rate.
Thus the meaning of the two unemployment indicators is different again.
7. I compared the national RYU in 2012 with the average rates of the 1998–1999 and 2000–2002
periods. In the case of Austria data are not available until 2011. In the case of the Czech
Republic data are available between 2009 and 2012. In the case of Estonia and Cyprus data
are not available before 2000. In the case of Croatia data are available since 2002.
8. Netherlands, Belgium and to a lesser extent, Luxemburg.
9. Eurostat statistics by theme, participation rates in education by age and sex.
10. Benelux, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, UK.
11. Own calculation from data in Eurofound (2012, 76 and 79).
12. Eurostat. Statistics by theme. Unemployment by sex and age groups – annual and monthly
average, 1000 persons and unemployment rate, seasonally not adjusted data.
13. Ibid.
14. Methodology: I used the numbers of inactive people by age group and the rate of those inac-
tive who are in education or training in the age group of 25–64. I counted those who are
unemployed, their participation rate in formal or informal education by age-cohorts. The par-
ticipation rates in education are given by Eurostat for 2007 and 2011 only, so I could count
the rate of NEETs for the adults in these two years. From the number of inactive people I sub-
tracted old age pensioners. Other pensioners and disabled can be in the younger NEET-genera-
tions too. The number of old age pensioners in 2011 is not given by Eurostat “Social
protection/Pensions beneficiaries” statistics, so I estimated it by extrapolating the data for
2006–2010. I assumed that all people over 64 years of age are old age pensioners and that all
old age pensioners are older than 54 years. This influences the rate of NEETs in the 35–54 and
55–64 age cohorts but does not change the rate of 35–64 year-old NEETs. The rates of NEETs
are given by the Eurostat for the 15–34 year-old population by 5-years age groups.
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